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Introduction
This book probes the tensions that lie at the very heart of American federalism, and the issues
with which the architects, scholars, and practitioners of American governance have been
struggling for over two centuries: How should we understand the constitutional design? In which
realms of regulatory decision making should the national government trump, and in which
should state or local decision makers lead? How should governance operate in regulatory realms
that straddle the two? Which branches of government should we entrust with making these calls?
What theoretical tools should help us interpret vague federalism directives? What are these
directives designed to accomplish? The introduction outlines the questions I hope to address,
charts the course of the discussion, and introduces my theoretical approach.
Written both for audiences new to these questions and those long familiar with them, the book
begins a philosophical conversation about the meaning of federalism through the lenses of the
competing values that undergird it and the theoretical models for interpreting federalism that
animate policy making and adjudication. I argue that federalism is best understood not just in
terms of the conflict between states’ rights and federal power, or the debate over judicial
constraints and political process, or even the dueling claims over original intent—but instead
through the inevitable conflicts that play out among federalism’s core principles. In regulatory
realms where these tensions are most heightened—such as environmental law, land use law, and
public health and safety regulation—the “tug of war” among underlying federalism values has
resulted in fluctuating Supreme Court interpretations and controversial decisions. Heightened
jurisdictional overlap in environmental law has especially pushed the Court’s federalism
decisions to extremes, helpfully exposing the fault lines between competing values. But
unfolding federalism conflicts over health law, consumer protection, and gay marriage are close
on the heels of the controversies that environmental federalism has helped expose.
Providing a new conceptual vocabulary for wrestling with these old dilemmas, the book traces
federalism’s internal tug of war through history and into the present, proposing a series of
innovations to bring judicial, legislative, and executive efforts to manage it into more fully
theorized focus. I outline a theory of Balanced Federalism that mediates the tensions within
federalism on three separate planes: (1) fostering balance among the competing federalism
values, (2) leveraging the functional capacities of the three branches of government in
interpreting federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state and federal actors in so
doing. After critiquing the Court’s recent embrace of greater jurisdictional separation and
stronger judicial constraints, the book imagines three successive means of coping with the values
tug of war within federalism, each experimenting with different degrees of judicial and political
leadership at different levels of government. Along the way, the analysis provides clearer
theoretical justification for the ways in which the tug of war is already legitimately mediated
through various forms of balancing, compromise, and negotiation.
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A. Federalism and the Quandaries Within
Through federalism directives both express and implied, the Constitution mandates a federal
system of dual sovereignty, establishing new authority in a national government while preserving
distinct authority within the more local state governments. Nevertheless, federalism has taken
different forms in countless nations worldwide and over the course of history. What exactly does
the Constitution require in allocating unique authority to the separate state and federal
governments? Are these allocations meant to be mutually exclusive? If not, what should happen
in areas of legitimate overlap?
In practical terms, the question really comes down to who gets to decide—the state or federal
government? In allocating authority this way, the Constitution essentially tells us who should
determine what regulatory policy looks like in various public spheres. To be sure, some realms
of governance are uncontroversially committed to one side or the other—for example, the
powers to coin money, wage war, and regulate interstate commerce are delegated to the national
government,1 while the states administer elections, local zoning, and police services.2 But
between the easy extremes are realms in which it is much harder to know what the Constitution
says about who calls the shots. Locally regulated land uses become entangled with the protection
of navigable waterways that implicate interstate commerce. State and local police remain bound
by federal proscriptions against unreasonable search and self-incrimination.3 And to what extent
should national regulations apply to the integral operations of state government?
In fact, American governance is so characterized by overlapping state and federal jurisdiction
that it has been compared not only to a layer cake but to a marble cake, with entangled swirls of
interlocking local and national law.4 Even so, when policy-making conflicts erupt within these
contexts of jurisdictional overlap, the “who gets to decide” question looms large. Is this a realm
in which federal power legitimately preempts contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause, or
a policy-making realm beyond the federally enumerated powers that has been purposefully
reserved to the states?5 And even if federal law could legally trump local initiative, does that
necessarily mean that it should? How should we decide?
For that matter, when the looming question is “who gets to decide—the state or federal
government,” then the critical corollary becomes “who gets to decide that?” When either the
regulatory context or the federalism directive itself is unclear, which branch of government
should determine what the Constitution is actually trying to say about who decides regulatory
policy? Are these decisions appropriately committed to the discretion of Congress, where
federalism concerns will be safeguarded by the political process in which state-elected
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–2, amend. XVII, art. II § 1, and amend. XII (describing state role in congressional and
presidential elections). See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (J. Powell, concurring)
(identifying zoning as one of the essential functions of local government).
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
4
MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar, ed., 2d ed. 1984).
5
U.S. CONST. art. VI (federal supremacy); amend. X (reserving non-enumerated powers to the states).
2
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representatives make national laws?6 Or should the Supreme Court be the final arbiter of these
issues, by creating judicially enforceable federalism constraints?7 We generally entrust the
Supreme Court to interpret the constitutional meaning of anti-majoritarian individual rights, but
is structural federalism different? What is the proper role of the executive branch, especially in
an age of increasing executive agency power?8 Is there a role for state governmental actors in
interpreting these questions?
In other words, interpreting federalism not only requires that we figure out what the
Constitution tells us about who gets to decide—who calls the shots in which regulatory context—
but also what it says about who decides whether it will be the state or federal government. The
Constitution allocates authority not only vertically between local and national actors, but
horizontally among the three separate branches of government.9 The legislative, executive, and
judicial branches each bring different interpretive resources to the constitutional project based on
their distinct features of institutional design. How should each branch participate in the
interpretation and implementation of American federalism? At times, political and judicial
federalism rhetoric draws heavily on a model of “zero-sum” federalism, suggesting winnertakes-all jurisdictional competition between state and federal policy makers and either/or
oversight by legislative or judicial arbiters.10 But how well does this model reflect what actually
happens in practice, deep within the intertwining folds of federalism-sensitive governance? How
well should it?
The constitutional ambiguity that makes answering these questions so difficult leads to the
next question, often overlooked in the federalism discourse: which federalism?—or, which
theoretical model of federalism should we use in interpreting this textual ambiguity? The
Constitution mandates but incompletely describes American dual sovereignty, leaving certain
matters open for interpretation by unspecified decision makers who must employ some kind of
theory—a philosophy about how federalism should operate—in order to fill in these gaps. Yet
constitutional interpreters can choose from more than one theoretical model of federalism in
doing so, just as the Supreme Court has done over the centuries in which its jurisprudence has
swung back and forth in answering similar questions differently at various times. The “dual
federalism” model, dividing state and federal jurisdiction largely along lines of subject matter,
6

E.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 588 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175–76 (1980).
7
E.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J.
75, 128 (2001); William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 782–83, 797–98 (1987).
8
E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008); Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
9
Horizontal federalism, which describes the interrelationships among the states, is another important dimension of
constitutional federalism. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
10
See, e.g., Ed Hornick, “Tenther” Movement Aims To Put Power Back in States’ Hands, CNN, Feb. 10, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/10/tenth.amendment.movement/index.html (describing sovereign
antagonism in the political sphere); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”).
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has predominated federalism theory at various points in American history, especially during the
nineteenth century.11 A model of tolerating greater jurisdictional overlap, often referred to as
“cooperative federalism,” has predominated federalism practice since at least the New Deal.12
And there are other alternatives. Are these different approaches to understanding federalism—
each sharing basic contours but diverging on the details—all valid? If more than one are valid,
how should we choose among them?
The “which federalism” dilemma leads back to the ultimate issue, the most important of all:
why federalism? Why did the architects of the Constitution choose a federal system? What is our
federal system of government meant to accomplish? If we can understand what American
federalism is for, then we are in a better position to choose which model of federalism to follow
in answering the perennial questions about who decides what in which context. However, this
last question proves more difficult than at first it may seem, because American federalism is
really for a number of different things—a collection of goals that are not always themselves in
agreement. Here is where federalism theory gets especially interesting, and where this book
makes its most important contribution.
As the Court regularly reaffirms, structural federalism is not an end in itself; it is crafted in
service of the Constitution’s more substantive commitments.13 Exploring the why of federalism
yields a number of good governance values that undergird it, each representing an ideal in
governance that federalism helps accomplish: checks and balances between opposing centers of
power that protect individuals, governmental accountability and transparency that enhance
democratic participation, local autonomy that enables interjurisdictional innovation and
competition, and the regulatory synergy that federalism enables between the unique capacities of
local and national government for coping with interjurisdictional problems that neither could
resolve alone. Each of these principles advances the ideal system of government that the framers
of the Constitution sought to build, and they have since gone on to take root in international good
governance norms. Nevertheless—and as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s vacillating
federalism jurisprudence—these values exist in tension with one another, setting federalism
interpretation up as a site of contest between honorable but occasionally competing principles.
The tug of war between competing federalism principles is built into American dual
sovereignty by design. For example, the strong checks and balances enabled by parallel state and
federal governments compromise the value of governmental transparency to some extent,
making it necessarily harder for average Americans to understand which elected representatives
are responsible for which policies simply by virtue of there being two choices. Similarly, if local
11

E.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 33–36 (2009); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 177–79 (2007).
12
Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 16–25, 31–47
(2008); SCHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 40–47.
13
E.g., Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 564 U.S. __, *9 (slip opinion) (2011), 2011Westlaw 2369334 (U.S.)
(“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their
own integrity. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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autonomy and innovation were all that mattered, there would be no need for a national
government at all; its existence reflects a purposeful choice to prioritize the individual-rights’
protective features of a system of checks and balances and the pragmatic problem-solving value
of a national federation for coping with shared interests and border-crossing problems.
Meanwhile, powerful tension can exist between the goal of preserving offsetting centers of state
and federal power while also harnessing problem-solving synergy between them in collaborative
contexts. Some regulatory contexts exacerbate these tensions more than others, but they are
implicated in all federalism controversies to varying degrees.
As noted, the fields of environmental law, land use law, and public health and safety
regulation especially showcase federalism’s internal tug of war.14 Sometimes, these fields
involve regulatory attempts to grapple with relatively newly identified problems—that is,
problems without a historically settled answer to the question of who should decide, such as
climate change. Other times, evidence increasingly reveals that a previously presumed “local”
problem—such as water pollution, disease control, marriage legitimacy, waste disposal, disaster
response, or even land use planning—also has important national implications. Meanwhile, such
presumably national problems as telecommunications, counterterrorism, and even international
relations are increasingly bound up with exercises of state and local authority. The “proper” level
of regulatory authority in these areas is often contested, underscoring conflicts between
federalism values that have resulted in judicial and political controversy.
With this tug of war lurking within all federalism quandaries, each resolution requires the
decision maker to choose, consciously or otherwise, how to prioritize among competing values
when they conflict. In the political sphere, the tug of war within is often obscured by the heat and
light generated by the substantive policy debates that spur actual federalism controversies—for
example, the respective roles of state and federal government in regulating minimum wages,15
radioactive waste,16 gun rights,17 violence against women,18 criminal law enforcement,19 healthcare policy,20 immigration,21 and marriage rights.22 Public debate often focuses on the first-order
14

Cf. Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
233 (2003).
15
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 838–40 (1976) (overruling prior precedent to hold that the Tenth
Amendment exempts state employment from federal requirements); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat’l League of Cities).
16
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75 (1992) (invalidating on Tenth Amendment grounds a federal
law requiring states to create waste disposal facilities or assume liability for harm).
17
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for
exceeding federal commerce authority); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating under the
Tenth Amendment parts of the Brady Handgun Control Act of 1993 for compelling state law enforcement).
18
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (VAWA) for exceeding Congress’s commerce power).
19
Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 564 U.S. __ (2011), 2011Westlaw 2369334 (U.S.) (holding that a criminal
defendant had standing to challenge on Tenth Amendment grounds her conviction under a federal statute
implementing an international treaty).
20
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010)
(arguing that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590 of March 2010, exceeds federal power
under the Commerce and General Welfare Clauses and conflicts with state law); Complaint, Florida v. Dep’t of
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policy question rather than second-order structural issues about who should get to decide, and
interest groups have often strategically deployed federalism rhetoric to advance a substantive
agenda, only to abandon regard for federalism when it no longer serves that interest.23
Theoretical shifts in the Supreme Court’s famous “New Federalism” cases further obfuscate
these tensions, implying that the only value of consequence is the preservation of checks and
balances between the separate reservoirs of local and national authority.24
Yet the tug of war continues, overtly or covertly, in each judicial, legislative, and
administrative decision that confronts these federalism controversies. This book proposes an
alternative model that finally accounts for this perpetual tug of war within federalism—one that
seeks balance between competing values and interpretive roles, rooting its analysis in the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution.

B. The Tug of War and the Tenth Amendment
Over most of the last century, the primary federalism debates among jurists and scholars have
focused on the extent of the Constitution’s grant of federal authority to regulate commerce25 and
to enforce the provisions of the post Civil-War amendments that eliminated slavery, protected
African-American voting rights, and guaranteed due process and equal protection of the law.26
The extent of state sovereign immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment has also

Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010) (similar challenge in a suit joined by more than a
dozen other states); Complaint, Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-71 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2010) (similar suit).
21
United States v. Arizona, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75558 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010).
22
E.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT, 21-36 (D. Mass. July 7, 2010)
(holding that the federal Defense of Marriage Act violates the Tenth Amendment).
23
See infra Chapter Two, notes 7–16 and accompanying text.
24
Beginning in the 1990s, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions known as its “New Federalism” cases that
articulated a more forceful judicial role in policing federalism. See infra Chapter Three, notes 216–49 and
accompanying text.
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the states, and
with Indian tribes); e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (affirming federal authority to proscribe intrastate
production and use of medical marijuana).
26
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (proscribing slavery), XIV (guaranteeing equal protection and due process), and XV
(protecting African-American voting rights); e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating
remedies under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 for exceeding congressional power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (invalidating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 for the same reason); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 for the same reason); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627
(declining to sustain the challenged portions of the VAWA under Section Five).
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generated controversy,27 as have isolated attempts to revive debate about congressional reach
under the federal Spending Power,28 and more recently, the Necessary and Proper Clause.29
Although it is the structural lodestar of constitutional federalism—affirming the default rule
that powers not delegated to federal government are reserved to the states30—only a handful of
twentieth-century federalism cases hinged on the Tenth Amendment. By one view of the
Constitution, interpreters might have relied heavily on its explicit text—“[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people”—to limit federal authority to strictly interpreted
enumerated powers. (Indeed, this is the view Thomas Jefferson took in protesting the early Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1789.31) Instead, most modern judicial federalism analyses sideline the
Tenth Amendment as surplusage, and the Supreme Court’s directly interpretive decisions mostly
address the narrow question of when federal law may not conscript state agents.32 Nevertheless,
these cases provide an uncluttered window into the Court’s evolving efforts to cope with
federalism’s internal tug of war—setting new benchmarks for jurisprudential instability.
Instability, of course, breeds opportunity. As the twenty-first century begins, an invigorated
federalism discourse has emerged in the political sphere that centers specifically and passionately
on the Tenth Amendment. About half the states are challenging the 2010 health reform
legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds in litigation certain to reach the Supreme Court.33
Thirty-eight states have introduced nonbinding resolutions or state constitutional amendments
reaffirming Tenth Amendment principles of state sovereignty in opposition to the new law, and
seven such bills have passed at least one state legislative house.34 Nullification bills based on the
Tenth Amendment have also been introduced in various state legislatures to repudiate federal

27

U.S. CONST. amend. XI (protecting states from certain citizen suits); e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712
(1999) (limiting Congress’s power to authorize suits against states in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (limiting Congress’s power to authorize suits against states in federal courts).
28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress to tax and spend for the public welfare); e.g., South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding federal power to condition federal highway funds on state adoption of a
minimum drinking age); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004) (affirming a federal statute prohibiting
bribery involving federal funds under the spending power); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147–48 (2003)
(affirming under the doctrine a federal law restricting certain publicly collected data from use as trial evidence).
29
In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005), Justice Scalia emphasized his concurrence on the basis of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Challenges to federal health reform have also been raised on these grounds. See Kevin
Sack, Terrain Shifts in Challenges to the Health Care Law, NY TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, at A10.
30
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31
See infra Chapter Three, notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
32
See supra note 15 (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
174–75 (1992) (holding that federal law compelling legislative participation violates the Tenth Amendment); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that compelling state executive participation does the same);
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (holding that federal law regulating state use of driver’s license
applicants’ personal information does not violate the Tenth Amendment).
33
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010); supra note 20 (describing multiple statefiled suits challenging the constitutionality of the Act).
34
PBS Newshour, States Challenge Health Care Reform (April 16, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/interactive/static/tables/health-states/.
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gun laws,35 tax collection,36 driver’s license requirements37 and the deployment of National
Guard troops abroad.38 One bill declared state authority to take federal lands through eminent
domain.39 In 2011, the Supreme Court permitted a woman convicted of harassing her neighbor
under a chemical weapons treaty to challenge her conviction on Tenth Amendment grounds—
raising controversial questions about the scope of federal authority to implement international
obligations at the local level.40 The Tenth Amendment has become a rallying cry among
advocates for state right-to-die legislation,41 home schooling,42 and sectarian education,43 and
among opponents of Medicaid and Medicare,44 federal financial reform45 and national climate
regulation.46 For all their differences, these efforts all share a basic premise that the relationship
between state and federal power implied by the Tenth Amendment has somehow gone astray.

35

Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-101 (2009).
E.g., State Authority and Tax Fund Act, H.B. 877, 2010 Sess. (Ga. 2010), State Sovereignty Act, H.B. 2810, 2010
Sess. (Okla. 2010); Washington State Sovereignty and Federal Tax Escrow Account of 2010, H.B. 2712, 2010 Sess.
(Wash. 2010).
37
ACLU, Anti-REAL ID Legislation in the States, http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/ (noting that no state met
the December 2009 deadline contemplated by the statute, and over half enacted or considered legislation prohibiting
compliance with the Act, defunding its implementation, or calling for its repeal). See also Anthony D. Romero,
Editorial, Opposing View: Repeal Real ID, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2007-03-05-opposing-view_N.htm (arguing that REAL ID violates the
Tenth Amendment, destroys dual sovereignty, and makes Americans vulnerable to identity theft).
38
See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html (reporting on a Utah bill).
39
Id. (reporting on bills considered in Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin); Jim Carlton, Federal Land Seizures
Urged by Utah Governor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304370304575151693915722022.html (reporting on a Utah law).
40
Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 564 U.S. __ (2011), 2011Westlaw 2369334 (U.S.). Although the Court’s
decision was limited to the question of standing, Bond’s substantive claim addresses the limits of federal authority in
implementing international treaties that displace state authority. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
41
See, e.g., Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R. Griffith, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: An Analysis and Commentary on
the Emerging Law of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 42 S.D. L. REV. 357, 372 (1997) (arguing that if the Tenth
Amendment requires greater federal deference to states rights, it should also require greater federal deference to
certain individual rights); Emily J. Sovell, Elderly, Be Alert: The Battle Continues over Deathbed Rights, 45 S.D. L.
REV. 670, 675 (2000) (discussing how right-to-die proponents rely on the Tenth Amendment). Cf. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (upholding the Oregon Death with Dignity Act without directly invoking the Tenth
Amendment but broadly addressing the relationship between state and federal power).
42
See, e.g., Lynn M. Stuter, Are Public Schools Constitutional?, Jan. 20, 2003,
http://www.newswithviews.com/Stuter/stuter9.htm (arguing that the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal
government from interfering in education).
43
See, e.g., EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING AND ABORTION
176 (1989) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment reserves state authority to assist sectarian schools and encourage
religious activities in public schools).
44
See supra notes 20 and 33–34.
45
Brian Roberts, Welcome to the Constitutional Crisis, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 27, 2010,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/04/27/welcome-to-the-constitutional-crisis/ (reporting on states’ rights
challenges to federal authority for proposed climate and financial reform legislation, among other bills).
46
Id.
36
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Invocations of the Tenth Amendment have come primarily from the right and are often
associated with the Tea Party,47 but they come increasingly from the left as well—in support of
gay rights, right-to-die statutes, and local climate initiatives, and in opposition to national
security policies alleged to threaten privacy and civil rights.48 In one notable example from 2010,
a Massachusetts federal district court invalidated on Tenth Amendment grounds portions of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act that impose certain federal proscriptions on gay marriage even
in states that have legalized it.49 Some members of the right and left have found common ground
in opposing the federal government’s unprecedented levels of deployment of state National
Guard troops in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.50 A new political movement known as “the
Tenthers” has coalesced around the ideals its adherents locate in the language of the Tenth
Amendment.51 Given the near void of legal precedential hooks for many of these Tenth
Amendment arguments, they do not necessarily reflect a practical strategy for litigation. Instead,
this popular recourse to Tenth Amendment principles seems to reflect an openly philosophical
movement about the meaning of dual sovereignty within the American federal system.
Most previous federalism scholarship has understandably focused on interpreting the
constitutional provisions that have held the most practical power in answering questions about
who gets to decide: the Commerce Clause, Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Spending Power. These parts of the Constitution have attracted
controversial judicial attention in recent decades, and they remain important, complex, and
potentially unstable areas of law. However, like the emerging contemporary discourse, this book
centers around the Tenth Amendment—the Constitution’s most explicit (if Delphic federalism
directive—because it provides the best constitutional locus for a philosophical conversation
about the critical opening questions: How should we understand American federalism? What is
federalism for? Who gets to decide?
In contrast to the constitutional implications of the Supremacy Clause and the federally
enumerated powers, the Tenth Amendment directly acknowledges dual sovereignty in
specifically juxtaposing distinct sets of state and federal authority. Its open-ended commitment to
47

E.g., Johnson, supra note 38. For a more scholarly discussion of the Tea Party, see Ilya Somin, The Tea Party
Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300 (2011).
48
Id.; Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33
(2009) (discussing state leadership in progressive policymaking and interactive state-federal governance).
49
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT, 21-36 (D. Mass. July 7, 2010)
(ruling that the federal Defense of Marriage Act violates the Tenth Amendment).
50
TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, Bring the Guard Home Legislation (2010),
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/bring-the-guard-home/ (listing state campaigns to reassert
governors’ control over state national guard troops); Benson Scotch, Legal Memo on Wisconsin Safeguard the
Guard Act, BRING THE GUARD HOME!, Mar. 13, 2010,
http://www.bringtheguardhome.org/publications/scotch_legal_memo_wisconsin_safeguard_guard (legal memo to
state veterans’ committee defending proposed legislation to impose state review of U.S. presidential requests to
federalize state national guard troops).
51
Rick Montes, What is a Tenther?, NEW YORK TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (2010),
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/05/06/what-is-a-tenther/ (defining the movement); Radley Balko, The
"Tenther" Smear, REASON.COM, Sept, 21, 2009, http://reason.com/blog/2009/09/21/the-tenther-smear (defending the
movement).
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dual sovereignty conveys both the ambition and indeterminacy that complicate American
federalism, inviting both the philosophical invocations we are currently seeing in the political
sphere and the rich, reflective decisions we see from the judiciary in adjudicating Tenth
Amendment claims. To be sure, fewer cases have been litigated under the Tenth Amendment
than the Commerce Clause, the primary practical arbiter of federal regulatory reach.
Nevertheless, Tenth Amendment cases deal most directly with the theoretical issues of dual
sovereignty that undergird all other areas of federalism doctrine. Unpacking federalism theory
through Tenth Amendment jurisprudence sheds light on the total package. After all, there is no
separate theory of federalism for Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause cases; answers to the
questions raised in both doctrinal realms stem from a single understanding about how to allocate
power in a federal system.52
The Tenth Amendment presents not only the best textual hook for our discussion, but also the
best scientific laboratory for its theoretical inquiry—precisely because the limited number of
cases allow clearer analysis of developments in the Supreme Court’s theoretical models of
federalism over time. Because only a few Tenth Amendment cases have been decided in each
generation, each one imposed special responsibility on the Court to think through its approach
without the weight of much controlling precedent. Each case also conferred a powerful
opportunity to reshape the doctrine according to the Court’s then-operative theory. Analysis of
this smaller but complete set accordingly showcases evolving federalism theories in use by
policy makers and adjudicators.
In contrast, the overall body of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is vast and amalgamated,
representing the undifferentiated accumulation of theoretical approaches by many judicial
interpreters over time. With dramatic exceptions at the margin, federalism practice under the
Commerce Clause largely continues to reflect New Deal era assumptions of vast (but not
unlimited) federal authority.53 The buffering effect of incrementally developed Commerce and
Spending Clause jurisprudence is important in its own right, explaining how overall federalism
practice remains relatively stable despite the shifts in prevailing judicial federalism theory more
evident in such areas as the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments and certain areas of
the Courts’ preemption jurisprudence.54
However, in exploring the different approaches available to federalism interpreters, the cases
that push the doctrine in new directions are the clearest revelations of new operative theory, and
52

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000), as quoted supra note 10 (demonstrating that
the theory of federalism underlying the new Commerce Clause economic activity test reflects the same as that
underlying the new Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule). See also Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 564
U.S. __, *13 (slip opinion) (2011), 2011Westlaw 2369334 (U.S.) (“The principles of limited national powers and
state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it.”). This
book could not cover the ground it does had it engaged every line of federalism doctrine at the same level of detail,
but neither is it necessary for this theoretical analysis.
53
E.g., Morrison, and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (articulating the economic activity test).
54
Although this book focuses on the Tenth Amendment, recent cases under the Eleventh Amendment, Section V of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the foreign affairs preemption power reflect similar theoretical trajectories. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 68–90, 234–40; infra Chapter Four.
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the Tenth Amendment cases provide the best laboratory for this analysis. The environmental
federalism cases that significantly fracture federalism values play an important role in this
analysis for the same reason. These cases occasionally test the margins of constitutional doctrine
in comparison to more mainstream economic regulation, but the fact that they push Tenth
Amendment, commerce, and spending doctrines to their logical limits forces us to think carefully
about the foundations of federalism doctrine and the purpose of the federal system.55 Engaging
the starkest realms of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence allows the clearest analysis of its
motivating theory, as well as the best opportunity for our own reflective evaluation.
The Tenth Amendment is thus where the Constitution most directly tells us that federalism is
important, and its jurisprudence offers a fitting laboratory for analysis of the overarching issues
in all corners of federalism doctrine. All that said, however, what exactly does the Tenth
Amendment tell us about federalism values and how to vindicate them? As a purely textual
matter, surprisingly little.
Famously critiqued as circular,56 the Tenth Amendment affirms simultaneous, separate,
sovereign authority in both the federal and state governments: “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively.” The federal powers enumerated in Article I establish more about what authority,
exactly, is delegated to the United States,57 while other constitutional provisions (such as those
requiring a republican form of government58 and full faith and credit59) tell us more about what is
prohibited to the states. The Supremacy Clause tells us something about what happens when
state and federal law conflict,60 and the Eleventh Amendment says something about when states
can be sued in federal court.61 Some believe that the (even-more-Delphic) Ninth Amendment
tells us something important about federalism as well.62 But all of these constitutional texts leave
plenty of room for interpretation in marginal cases—those where it is not entirely clear whether
the regulatory power at issue is one that has been delegated to the federal government, prohibited
to the states, or reserved to the states without federal interference. If nothing else, the federalism
dilemmas that arise in each generation affirm that there has been no shortage of marginal cases.
For that reason, it is up to us, and perhaps each generation anew, to revisit the foundational
questions about what American federalism means, what it is for, and what we ask it to
accomplish for us. We call the architects of the Constitution framers because they have given us
a framework powerful enough to survive the forces of economic upheaval and cultural change—
55

Cf. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the
occasionally awkward fit in applying the economic model of Commerce Clause regulation to environmental law).
56
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
59
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
60
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
61
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. What it actually says, however, departs markedly from how it is currently interpreted.
See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983).
62
E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801 (2008); Randy E.
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 80 (2006).
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but implementation remains our duty, and interpretation is the first task of implementation.
Interpreting federalism is more complicated than some have given it credit, for it is not simply a
matter of following allegedly simple constitutional instructions.63 The instructions are not very
simple, and the generations of ongoing federalism controversy prove the point. Instead,
interpreting federalism requires coping with the underlying tug of war between the fundamental
federalism values, developing a theoretical model for interpretive guidance, and allocating
responsibility among the branches and levels of government for doing the critical interpretive
work that will ultimately decide—well, who gets to decide.
The era in which the Tenth Amendment was dismissed as sheer textual surplusage may be
coming to a close . . . or not.64 Either way, its passionate invocation in the political sphere, its
revolving interpretation by the Supreme Court, even its suggestively poetic language all beckon
us to consider—through its very ambition and indeterminacy—what American federalism is all
about. Today’s Tenth Amendment revival has intensified in the wake of broad regulatory
responses to the Great Recession of 2008, just as federalism concerns ignited a previous
generation over New Deal regulatory responses to the Great Depression of 1929. In the New
Deal era, the need for powerful federal responses to a nationwide economic crisis that had
exceeded state grasp led the prevailing federalism interpreters to choose a model prioritizing
interjurisdictional problem solving over all other considerations.65 The contemporary discourse
arises from an era in which the prevailing judicial and political federalism rhetoric has privileged
checks and balances over competing values.66
It is impossible to know how the unstable jurisprudence will next turn. Yet it is possible to
ground the debate in a more nuanced model for understanding federalism—one that can account
for the twists and turns of history while stabilizing the tug of war within a framework that allows
for the values dialectic without requiring a theoretical paradigm shift in each instance. Though it
is no modest task, it is my hope that this book will help channel the federalism debate into this
more fruitful territory.

C. Charting the Course
The book sets out to accomplish four things, in four parts. Part I argues that the key to
understanding federalism is not through the political competition between advocates of states’
rights and centralized power, but in the theoretical tensions among its constituent values—
revealing the tug of war that so complicates federalism interpretation. Chapter One frames the
inquiry, highlighting the nature of federalism interpretation as a choice among competing
63

Cf. PURCELL, supra note 11.
See Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227, 564 U.S. __, *14 (slip opinion) (2011), 2011Westlaw 2369334 (U.S.)
(acknowledging the question “[w]hether the Tenth Amendment is regarded as simply a ‘truism,’or whether it has
independent force of its own”); MARK R. KILLENBECK (ED.), THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
(2002) (further discussing the issue).
65
See infra Chapter Three, notes 115–57 and accompanying text.
66
See infra Chapter Four.
64
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theoretical models. It explores the constitutional basis for federalism interpretive uncertainty, and
it illustrates the stakes of the choice by analyzing the role of federalism-related conflicts in the
failed response to Hurricane Katrina. Chapter Two probes the principles of good government on
which federalism is premised, exploring their basis in history and contemporary jurisprudence,
and the tensions that flare among them. Chapter Three reveals how this tug of war has surfaced
in the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to federalism over the twentieth century. It traces how
the Court’s decisions showcase a series of theoretical federalism models that variously privilege
one value over another without ever recognizing the source of instability.
Part II discusses the challenges of administering federalism in contexts of concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction, and analyzes how theoretical elements in the Court’s status quo approach
fall short. Bringing the analysis to the present day, it explores how the tug of war within
federalism is heightened in contexts of overlap where both the federal and state governments
have legitimate regulatory interests or obligations. Chapter Four describes the philosophical
nostalgia for the old dual federalism model that surfaces in many of the Supreme Court’s New
Federalism cases, critiquing the failure of this model to contend with the problems of
accelerating jurisdictional overlap. It follows the logical trajectory of the Tenth Amendment and
contemporaneous preemption cases toward greater separation between state and federal authority
notwithstanding the predominance of jurisdictional overlap in American governance.
Chapter Five introduces the interjurisdictional gray area that pervades cooperative federalism
and confounds dual federalism—a rich soil of regulatory uncertainty from which the most
pressing federalism controversies emerge. It illustrates gray area regulatory challenges with
examples from environmental, public health, financial, and national security law, with special
attention to the challenges of water pollution, climate change, and disaster response that most
exacerbate the tensions of federalism. These are the examples that push federalism doctrine to its
extremes, demonstrating the fault lines created in regulatory realms where interests in local
autonomy and national uniformity most directly collide.
In consideration of the unresolved tug of war, Part III introduces the Balanced Federalism
alternative at the heart of the book: a theoretical model that focuses on the equipoise between
competing federalism values and between the distinct interpretive contributions of the branches
of government at both the state and federal levels. Balanced Federalism explicitly accounts for
the tug of war within, offers better tools for coping with jurisdictional overlap, and identifies
opportunities for all branches of all levels of government to participate in safeguarding
federalism values. It provides the means for a theorized exit from the cycle of jurisprudential
instability, in which federalism theory is continually haunted by the formalist ghost of
nineteenth-century dualism despite the functional demands of jurisdictional overlap.
In the first of a three-stage proposal, Chapter Six imagines judicial Balanced Federalism
constraints that could operate in lieu of the judicial constraints established by the New
Federalism Tenth Amendment cases. Its jurisprudential standard would assess the real problem
in Tenth Amendment contexts—the risk that challenged activity in the gray area undermines
federalism principles, taken as a whole. The chapter details the factors such a balancing test
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might consider, considers the advantages and disadvantages of judicial balancing in these
contexts, and illustrates its application in federalism controversies ranging from climate
governance to health insurance reform. The balancing test most forthrightly illustrates the
values-balancing principle of the model, although the strong role it articulates for judicial review
is progressively moderated by the successive proposals.
Chapter Seven explores a more modest proposal emphasizing greater judicial deference to
legislative intergovernmental bargaining. It considers how the Constitution confers jurisdictional
entitlements to state and federal actors, and explores the extent to which federalism doctrine
allows their consensual exchange.67 Taking the example of ongoing conflict over radioactive
waste siting as a case study of jurisdictional overlap, it argues that in New York v. United
States,68 the Court unwisely withdrew the potential for state-led bargaining over Tenth
Amendment entitlements. The chapter shows why facilitating legislative bargaining of the sort
outlawed in New York is ultimately more faithful to the underlying values of federalism than
current doctrine, and more consistent with the rest of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. The
judicial deference this proposal calls for would trump the judicial balancing test in application to
consensual bargaining over Tenth Amendment entitlements, and it lays the conceptual
groundwork for even broader deference to intergovernmental bargaining proposed in Part IV.
Drawing on the theoretical tools established in Part III, Part IV more fully explores the
undertheorized role of the political branches in protecting federalism at both the state and federal
levels. The final chapters explore the extent to which federalism-sensitive governance is already
the product of widespread intergovernmental bargaining, and the extent to which valuesbalancing in negotiated federalism is a legitimate means of interpreting constitutional directives.
Chapter Eight situates the importance of state-federal bargaining within the historic federalism
safeguards debate, which has previously considered only which branch of the federal
government best protects federalism. It then maps the existing landscape of federalism
bargaining, surveying constitutional and statutory forums in which legislative, executive, and
even judicial actors negotiate with counterparts across state-federal lines. Chapter Nine
incorporates primary and secondary research to extrapolate the negotiating norms and media of
exchange that define the structural safeguards of federalism bargaining. By merging state and
federal interests in policy making and enforcement decisions, bilaterally negotiated governance
honors federalism concerns at a structural level independent from competing first-order policy
concerns.
Finally, Chapter Ten proposes criteria for recognizing interpretive partnerships among the
three branches on both sides, identifying the procedural constraints that confer legitimacy on the
results of state-federal legislative and executive bargaining. It provides justification for judicial
deference to federalism bargaining after establishing that these baseline criteria are met, along
67

Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (analyzing legal entitlements through the conceptual vocabulary adopted
in Chapter Seven).
68
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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with a fully theorized basis to account for the legitimately negotiated governance that is already
widespread under cooperative federalism. In the final stage of the Balanced Federalism proposal,
I argue that state-federal negotiation is a legitimately constitutional way of interpreting
federalism—that is to say, of deciding who gets to decide—when the bargaining process is
consistent with the principles of fair bargaining and the core federalism values introduced in Part
I.
After all, the federalism values are themselves procedural aspirations of good governance:
shepherding us toward public process that checks power to protect individuals, ensures
accountability to enable democratic participation, fosters localism to cultivate autonomy and
innovation, and affords opportunities for interjurisdictional synergy. When the bargaining
process is faithful to these values, the political consensus yields constitutionally valid results that
warrant judicial deference—even when substantive consensus on the federalism question cannot
be won. Moreover, bilateral bargaining structurally reinforces protection for federalism values
that transcends the subjective concerns of the negotiators and surpasses the political safeguards
available at the purely unilateral level. In this way, federalism bargaining supplements other
means of interpreting federalism, filling inevitable substantive gaps by utilizing the unique
interpretive capacity that all branches of government bring to the table.
This final stage of the proposal advances all three goals of Balanced Federalism, enabling
more conscientious balancing among the competing federalism values, the interpretive capacity
of each branch of government, and the wisdom of both state and federal perspectives in locating
appropriate results in each circumstance. Procedural deference to qualifying bargaining trumps
the Chapter Six balancing test and all other judicial federalism constraints while subsuming the
more limited deference proposed in Chapter Seven. Judicial balancing remains available to test
unilateral and extreme gray area governance against federalism concerns, but it is appropriately
moderated by the procedural deference that Balanced Federalism seeks for governance that
meets the criteria set forth in Chapter Ten.

D. The Balanced Federalism Alternative
Before the journey begins, I offer a final note about the relationship between Balanced
Federalism theory and its predecessors. The federalism debates have long raged between
advocates of greater state autonomy and greater national power (reviewed more fully in Part II),
as well as between champions of judicially enforceable federalism constraints and believers in
the procedural safeguards built into the constitutional design (reviewed more fully in Part IV).
To grossly oversimplify the discourse, many advocates for state autonomy urge judicial doctrine
that enforces a zone of state sovereignty free of federal incursion, while process federalists
maintain that the balance of state and federal power is sufficiently protected by the political
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process itself.69 And of course, there are countless examples of outlying decisions and creative
federalism theory that defy these caricatures entirely, proposing more nuanced and entirely
different ways of understanding American federalism.70
The values-based theory of Balanced Federalism proposed in this book is also positioned
somewhere between these rough poles, providing theoretical justification for the functional
account embraced by the process school while preserving a limited role for the judicial review
advocated by the sovereignty school (and thus with the potential to jar those fully committed to
either one or the other view).71 In contrast to recent scholarship focusing primarily on the judicial
role, my approach fully embraces the federalism of policy-making authority, balancing its theory
of judicial review with a more theorized account of the interpretive role that state and federal
political branches also play in federalism implementation. Contextualizing abstract ideas with
rich factual examples, the book explores the application of Balanced Federalism ideals within
case studies of disaster response, stormwater management, nuclear waste siting, and climate
governance.
Importantly, however, the theory of federalism I advance here is not committed to locating
dominant political power at either the state or national level. Like other scholarship in the
emerging literature of dynamic federalism, this book emphasizes the value of fluidity and
overlap between state and federal authority when that is consistent with basic constitutional
premises.72 Sometimes ideal governance in federalism-sensitive realms takes place municipally,
sometimes through the state, and sometimes at the national level. And sometimes, as the climate
dilemma in Chapter Five portends, regulatory challenges require collaboration at all points along
69

See Heather Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–21 (2010) (providing a
contemporary intellectual history of the federalism debates).
70
E.g., id.; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 908–14 (1994); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001).
71
Outstanding contrary work from within each school will alternatively take issue with my reading of New
Federalism’s debt to dual federalism, my embrace of constitutional balancing, and my faith in some role for judicial
discretion and political bargaining. The discourse is too vast for me to respond where we part company while
making the contribution I hope to add, but footnotes throughout the book provide a road map to various viewpoints
that have paved the way. For a small sample of this compelling literature, see JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST
FEDERATION (2009); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); ROBERT
A. GOLDWIN (ED.), A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1974); MICHAEL S. GREVE,
REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN (1999); GRODZINS, supra note 4; MALCOLM M.
FEELEY AND EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008); ALISON L.
LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010); ROBERT F. NAGLE, THE IMPLOSION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001); JOHN NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009); PURCELL, supra note 11; SCHAPIRO, supra note 11; DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
72
E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12; SCHAPIRO, supra note 11; William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise:
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L. J. 145 (2007); Kirsten H.
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Gerken,
supra note 69; Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011); Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008). See also
LACROIX, supra note 71, (charting the legal history of jurisdictional multiplicity); PURCELL, supra note 11 (arguing
that the Constitution’s dynamic balance of power does not mandate a specific normative theory of federalism).

18 (page numbers not final for citation purposes)

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1991612

Ryan

FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN

(Oxford, 2012)

the spectrum of political scale, given the unique sources of authority, expertise, and regulatory
capacity for response at each. One critique of dynamic federalism is that enabling regulatory
overlap may effectively preempt one level’s decision not to regulate in a given sphere.73
However, when demands for governance are reasonably within the consensus of government
obligation, then the dialectic of regulatory backstop created by this fluidity is a desirable feature
of multilevel governance.74 Time and again, history offers testimony to the value of overlapping
state and federal regulatory authority in protecting individual rights, stewarding public goods,
and inspiring regulatory innovation.75
As source material in the book suggests, my own interest in federalism was inspired by
environmental law, which provides an excellent example of dual sovereignty at its best.
Historical events match a recent era of state regulatory dominance with a preceding era of federal
regulatory dominance in which each took up slack left by the other. In the 1970s, the federal
government enacted comprehensive environmental statutes to fill the state regulatory void that
had allowed air and water quality to degrade beyond public tolerance.76 The availability of
redundant regulatory authority at the federal level helped forestall even greater public health and
natural resource crises, though federal efforts were themselves modeled after successful state
innovators.77 Then, beginning in the 2000s, state and local governments stepped into the federal
void to explore how best to mitigate and adapt to the anticipated harms of climate change.78 State
and local experimentation has yielded critical developments in green building laws,
transportation and land use planning, renewable resource portfolio standards, emissions controls,
and even carbon markets—all of which have since become the subject of congressional interest
in proposed federal climate legislation.79 But for the availability of redundant regulatory
authority at the state level, the people of the United States would enjoy far reduced
environmental security.
The history of state-federal turn-taking on civil rights and even property rights tells a similar
tale. The federal government intervened before and during the Jim Crow era to more fully protect
the rights of black Americans,80 and many states are now stepping into the void of federal law to
73
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text.
75
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REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119 (Jörg Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006).
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protect the rights of gay and lesbian Americans.81 No federal law bars discrimination against
sexual orientation in employment,82 while many states now do.83 But again, roles are
occasionally reversed even within a period of state or federal dominance. For example,
California voters amended the state constitution in 2008 to recognize only marriages between a
man and a woman,84 but in 2010, a federal judge invalidated the provision for transgressing the
U.S. Constitution’s promise of equal protection.85 Although the decision may yet be overturned
on appeal,86 it was the first in the nation to uphold gay marriage rights on federal constitutional
grounds.87 Meanwhile, federal law innovated due process protection for previously unrecognized
property interests in Goldberg v. Kelly,88 while many states invented new protections for real
property against eminent domain after Kelo v. City of New London.89
Not every aspect of American federalism can be generalized from the wrenching conflicts
posed by these areas of law, but the most difficult cases provide insight into the governing
norms, and the extremes often suggest something valuable about what normal should look like.
Moreover, the political landscape is increasingly strewn with equally difficult cases in other
regulatory arenas, such as state laws governing medical marijuana and assisted suicide, and
federal health care and financial reform. Difficult cases, it would seem, are again the federalism
norm.
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The history of our federalism is one of both gradual adjustment and dynamic change, as
Americans continue to grapple with the societal issues of the day, the purposes of government,
and the implications of multiple sources of authority within a federal system. This book offers a
theoretical tour of some of these issues, and an alternative concept of federalism that allows
flexibility for the ongoing dialectic between those periods in history when local innovation is
most needed and those when national uniformity must prevail. Hopefully clear by now, it is more
a work of federalism theory than an exegesis of federalism doctrine. Understanding federalism as
that sum total of doctrinal rules within which cases are decided is critical for the practice of law,
but this treatment analyzes federalism through the theoretical lens interpreters use to consider
these issues in the first instance. It focuses on the cases and dilemmas that define shifts in the
underlying theoretical terrain, and its proposals engage purposefully and provocatively in theorybuilding from the ground up, leaving open questions in their wake.
Ultimately, my aim is to clarify the goals of federalism, the tensions within, and the promise
that a more balanced model dual sovereignty offers for coping with the most pressing issues of
our time. Values balancing and intergovernmental bargaining reframe the obligations of
conscience and deference that operate among all three branches in both state and federal realms,
demonstrating the interpretive role each plays in implementing our federal system. Balanced
Federalism theory defuses some of the more hegemonic assumptions that resurfaced in the New
Federalism revival and begins a more honest conversation about the genuine interpretive choices
and trade-offs that federalism requires. A more balanced approach to understanding state-federal
relations offers hope for moving beyond the paralyzing features of the federalism discourse that
have stymied it for so long. In the end, the proposals in the book may raise as many questions as
they answer, but the questions are surely worth our time.
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